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Abstract 
 
Political Discussion Network Homogeneity and Partisan Selective Exposure 
 
Jacob Reid Thompson, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Wenhong Chen 
 
This thesis examines the nature of political discussion networks in the period leading up 
to the 2016 presidential election and the relationship between discussion network composition 
and partisan selective exposure. Using a nationally representative panel survey, this research 
examines the partisan makeup of discussion networks across sociodemographic factors, 
evaluating mainstream media narratives that attribute surprise at Donald Trump’s victory within 
to voting blocs insulating themselves from alternative views. It also examines whether there is a 
relationship over time between discussion network partisanship and homogeneity and partisan 
selective exposure.  It finds differences in network partisanship and network partisan distance 
from ego across respondent partisan affiliation, race, and income consistent with a theoretical 
framework that suggests partisan sorting is an indirect result of geographic sorting. Further, it 
concludes that there is a relationship between network partisan distance from ego and subsequent 
selective exposure, in line theoretical models in which discussion with like-minded alters 
reinforces partisan attitudes, which lead to further selective exposure. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 In the wake of the 2016 election, pundits and media personalities searched for a narrative 
to explain how a candidate as contentious as Donald Trump could win the presidency and how so 
much of the election coverage had failed to present a Trump victory as a real possibility. One 
idea put forward that gained much attention was that American voters tend to insulate themselves 
from exposure to opposing views both in their interpersonal interactions and in the media they 
consume (e.g. Bump, 2017; Hess, 2017; Murray, 2017; Robson, 2018; Silver, 2017; Thompson, 
2016). This idea gained further traction as more attention was paid to the role of social 
networking sites in circulating “fake news” targeting various demographic groups and questions 
of ideological insulation – or political bubbles – became part of the election coverage.  Two 
years after the election, the theme continues to pervade mainstream news coverage ( e.g. Block, 
Buchannan, Katz, & Quealy, 2018; Robson, 2018; Zadrozny, 2018), especially as the president 
has continued to tweet about fake, partisan news and the Senate Intelligence Committee confirms 
that Russia conducted targeted media campaigns to influence the election. Drawing on a national 
panel survey of Americans in May of 2016 and of 2017, this thesis aims to interrogate the 
overarching narrative of partisan insulation based on identity and media selection in the context 
of the 2016 presidential campaign, paying particular attention to the networks of individuals with 
whom we discuss politics and the choices we make in selecting our political news sources.  
While these questions seem to have increased salience after the most recent federal 
election cycle, there is an extensive history of research on these subjects, stretching back to the 
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mid-twentieth century. Emerging from the seminal work of Lazarsfeld,  Berelson, and colleagues 
(P.F. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Miyamoto, & McFee, 
1954), a body of work has emerged examining the role of discussion networks in the formation 
of political positions and in shaping civic engagement. Studies in this tradition have found that 
we are more likely to discuss important matters with individuals similar to ourselves in terms of 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. Marsden, 1987; Mcpherson, Smith-
lovin, & Cook, 2001). More recent work (e.g. Mutz, 2002; Sinclair, 2012) has provided evidence 
that the political views of those with whom we discuss politics can influence our own positions.  
 This thesis first examines whether individuals, in fact, found themselves discussing 
politics within likeminded partisan networks during the 2016 election, asking if there are 
differences in network partisanship and ideological distance from ego across socio-cultural and 
economic divisions. Ego networks were assessed based on whether alters leaned Republican, 
leaned Democratic, or neither, with partisan lean being averaged for the network as a whole. By 
examining the degree of partisanship in political discussion networks during the election, I aim 
to both evaluate the accuracy of media narratives surrounding partisan insularity during the 
campaign and provide new descriptive data on partisan sorting in the contemporary political 
climate, assessing whether such sorting is consistent with the existing theoretical framework. In 
doing so, I will also go one step further than other contemporary research on discussion network 
sorting, providing new data on the degree to which network partisanship and distance from ego 
vary across demographic groups that may contribute to sorting, where individuals find 
themselves in communities of others like themselves. Findings are consistent with the idea that 
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sorting occurs primarily along visible, salient socio-demographic and socio-cultural 
characteristics, leading to politically like-minded networks indirectly. 
 The second component of this thesis examines the degree to which political discussion 
networks consisted of people with similar political views and whether this differed across 
demographic groups. This lens (measured by what I call “partisan distance,” which is the 
difference between ego’s party affiliation and the mean party affiliation of their alters) is 
necessary to understand not just the direction of network partisanship, but the degree of 
ideological insularity that actually occurred. This is important in situations when a particular 
demographic group might find themselves geographically located such that their networks lean 
primarily toward one end of the partisan spectrum, but where said demographic group is not 
monolithic in its party affiliation, and therefore network partisanship alone cannot be used to 
understand how much difference of opinion is at play. Where network partisanship indicates 
whether individuals found themselves in Democratic or Republican-leaning discussion networks, 
partisan distance from ego measures the degree to which they found themselves in echo 
chambers. For the purposes of this thesis, discussion networks are examined in terms of ego 
demographics, with particular attention to demographic divisions that were paid the most 
attention in media coverage of the 2016 election: partisanship, gender, race, income, and 
education. In order to further understand how the strength of a relationship – as opposed to just 
convenience - might contribute to the makeup of discussion networks, I also assess differences 
along the measure of perceived closeness. Results show differences in network partisanship 
across ego partisanship, race, and income as well as differences in network partisan distance 
across ego partisanship, race, income, and closeness. 
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 The proposition that individuals prefer sources of information that are closer to their own 
view to sources that take opposing propositions – a phenomenon referred to as selective exposure 
– has similar roots in Lazarsfeld et al.’s (1954) work. It has since been developed into its own, 
sometimes overlapping, body of research, though when and to what extent selective exposure 
takes place has been subject to greater debate. Nevertheless, more recent work has consistently 
demonstrated selective behavior in the context of partisan politics (Hart et al., 2009; Iyengar & 
Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008, 2011). 
Multiple, perhaps compatible, mechanisms for explaining selective exposure have been 
proposed, including avoiding cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957),  choosing news sources 
that help one reach a socially advantageous position (A. W. Kruglanski, 1990), or choosing 
information based on a biased interpretation of what is most accurate (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 
1979). This thesis asks whether there is a relationship between discussion network partisanship 
and partisan selective exposure and considers how each of these mechanisms could contribute to 
the result.  Findings are consistent with the idea that like-minded discussion networks may 
enable more partisan selective exposure.  
By addressing how network composition relates to partisan selective exposure, this thesis 
brings together work on political discussion networks and selective exposure to assess the 
particular circumstances in which people discussed and consumed political news during the 2016 
campaign.  Questions about the nature of networks and their role in selective behavior are 
addressed with respect to the 2016 election, but inferential analysis of the relationship between 
partisan discussion networks and selective exposure provides insight into the broader 
relationship between discussion network composition and selective exposure. 
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With regards to the specifics of the 2016 election, I ask to what degree are politics of 
identity and demographics are manifested in the partisanship and ideological diversity of 
discussion networks. Findings suggest that Americans did discuss politics in discussion networks 
where both network partisanship and network partisan distance from ego varied with salient 
socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors. Notably, along with ego’s party affiliation, the 
sociodemographic factors across which network partisanship varied in May 2016 were race, 
education, and income (where only partisanship and race had a statistically significant 
relationship to network partisanship once all demographic factors were included).  Network 
partisan distance from ego varied with respondent’s race, income, and party affiliation, with all 
three having statistically significant relationships to network partisan distance. These results are 
consistent the notion that partisan discussion networks form along demographics that lead to 
geographical sorting and that networks are shaped as much by convenience as by ideological 
compatibility. 
On a broader scale, this thesis asks whether discussion partner choice and media choice 
are part of a larger practice of selection, in which individuals choose exposure to not only media 
but also discussion partners who will reaffirm their existing beliefs and in which like-minded 
discussion networks make choosing like-minded media more desirable. This question is 
increasingly important as political discussion and media consumption increasingly take place in 
an online setting designed to allow individuals to discuss politics in niche communities and find 
news tailored to their preconceptions. Previous work has examined how selective media 
consumption correlated with partisan and homogeneous discussion environments but has not 
demonstrated a relationship between the two. While this thesis does not attempt to answer the 
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question of causality, its results address this gap in the literature and demonstrate a relationship 
between ideological insularity within discussion networks and subsequent selective behavior, 
providing the first inferential data linking ideological homogeneity of the network with the 
practice of selective exposure. It then posits that if like-minded discussion leads to stronger 
partisan attitudes, as evidenced in previous work on the subject  (e.g Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Meng, 2009) suggests, there is a logical path through which network composition may influence 
partisan selective exposure. Further such a path would be consistent with the current models for 
selective behavior.  
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
This literature review draws on two primary research traditions focused on political 
discussion networks and on selective exposure as well as the limited work examining their 
intersections. It begins with work on discussion networks, and specifically focuses on the body 
of literature surrounding political discussion networks and their composition in order to 
contextualize divisions that may have led to increasingly biased discussion networks during the 
2016 campaign and to examine whether existing theory regarding divisions into homogeneous 
discussion networks are consistent with the divisions that occurred leading up to the election. 
Because the narrative surrounding the 2016 election so heavily focused on online interactions 
and media consumption, it also pays special attention to work examining the relationship 
between core discussion networks and the growth of the internet.  It then explores the evolving 
explanations for selective exposure, building on recent interventions into the literature that begin 
to question how individuals’ networks might influence media choice. This thesis brings together 
these bodies of literature, providing a framework for examining the compatibility of current 
theoretical mechanisms for selective exposure and actual practices from 2016 to 2017, as well as 
for conducting inferential analyses of the relationship between the partisan composition of 
discussion networks and partisan consumption of news. 
Discussion Networks  
It has been long understood that interpersonal communication influences the consumption 
and effects of mass media (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). More recent work in this tradition has 
recognized the potential for interpersonal communication to enhance or exacerbate the sense of 
polarization and distrust in the media that comes with a highly politicized environment (Shah et 
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al., 2017).  In line with Dewey’s (1938) argument that the act of engaging with an idea has more 
influence than simple passive absorption of information, it has been proposed that meaningful 
discussions of politics act not only as an attempt to persuade others, but also to strengthen one’s 
one beliefs through expression (Habermas, 1984; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000). 
 Thus one’s social network has the potential to play an important role in the development 
of political identity, and those with whom one discusses politics may have an outsized role in 
determining one’s partisanship expression. Granovetter’s  (1973) seminal work on network 
composition suggests that social networks consist of both strong and weak ties, which can be 
leveraged in different ways to enhance social capital. While a network might contain a greater 
number of weak ties – acquaintances that play a crucial role in the spread of information between 
groups – strong ties are closer connections who are relied on as confidants and sources of 
support, and who are likely to be similar to ego. Research on the relationships between strong 
ties has shown that individuals typically have a small number of trusted contacts with whom they 
discuss important matters, referred to as core discussion network (e.g. Marsden, 1987). This 
thesis focuses on understanding the partisanship of respondent’s strong ties and the partisan 
dynamics of those relationships, as strong ties are both the individuals with whom respondents 
are most likely to discuss politics and those who are most likely to impact their views. 
 Contemporary research on discussion networks considers the effects of the online 
environment and how it might change the roles of core networks and weaker ties; this is 
particularly relevant in addressing discussion network composition and news consumption in an 
election cycle when online news itself was a subject of debate and potential foreign interference. 
Recent years have seen a great deal of work examining whether the internet has led to a decline 
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in core networks. Much of this work responds to concerns about increasing isolation raised in 
Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2001) and Mcpherson et. al’s (2005) finding that core network sizes 
declined between 1985 and 2004. A number of additional studies found evidence suggesting that 
internet use might be partly responsible for this change (Brashears, 2011; Chen, 2013), while 
others found a positive relationship between internet use and discussion network size (Gross, 
Katz, & Rice, 2003; Robinson & Martin, 2010; Zhao, 2006). Research to date then does has not 
reached a consensus opinion that internet use leads to differences in discussion network 
composition.  
 Other recent projects have worked to understand how interpersonal and mass 
communication interact in a world where communication increasingly take’s place online. 
Studies have shown that online dialogue can have similar effects to face-to-face conversation in 
terms of political outcomes (Delli Carpini, 2013; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). Shah, 
McLeod, Rojas, Cho, Wagner & Friedland (2017) propose a model in which the medium of 
communication is less important than the ideological diversity of perspectives that individuals 
consume. They argue that there is a positive feedback loop – see Slater’s (2015) reinforcing 
spirals – between partisan media use and expression of partisan views within a discussion 
network. According to Shah et al., partisan discussion reinforces views leading to partisan media 
consumption that itself reinforces views and leads to partisan discussion, all within an 
environment that integrates the online and offline. In these contexts, both consumption and 
expression of partisan views act to reify individual’s beliefs. 
 Studies of core discussion networks (e.g. the General Social Survey) typically ask 
respondents about individuals with whom they discuss “important matters.” Within work on 
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political discussion networks, specifically, this precedent is often adopted, both to provide 
consistency across network studies and to avoid triggering potential over-reporting of political 
discussion. However, some investigations interested specifically in political discussion (this 
thesis included) specifically ask about those with whom one discusses politics, accounting for 
possible differences between general discussion partners and political discussion partners. While 
there is some evidence to suggest that political discussion networks are less dense and 
interconnected than general core discussion networks (Eveland & Kleinman, 2013), analysis by 
Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe (2009) suggests that the difference between core discussion 
networks and political discussion networks is relatively small and that during election season, 
political discussion becomes so prevalent in the core discussion network that asking for people 
with whom one discusses politics elicits the same results as asking for those with whom one 
discusses important matters. This suggests that for the purposes of this thesis, it is likely that 
previous findings about core discussion networks also apply to political discussion networks.  
Starting with the seminal study by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), empirical research has 
consistently found that discussion networks tend to be homogenous relative to the general 
population in terms of sociodemographic characteristics as well as in terms of attitudes and 
beliefs (e.g. P.F. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Marsden, 1987; Mcpherson et al., 2001). More recent 
research has suggested that more diverse discussion networks lead to greater likelihood of 
opinion change (Ben-Nun Bloom & Levitan, 2011; Levitan & Visser, 2008) and that network 
composition may impact stability and strength of attitudes (Levitan & Visser, 2009). 
This thesis investigates homogeny within political discussion networks in terms of alter 
partisanship and how it relates to ego’s partisanship. It begins by asking if there are differences 
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in the partisan environments in which different sociodemographic groups tend to discuss politics. 
It also examines this environment in terms of “partisan distance,” which measures the difference 
between ego’s party affiliation and the mean party affiliation of their discussion partners. These 
metrics are applied for every sociodemographic factor considered, in order to paint a picture of 
both the partisan lean of discussion networks and the degree of counter-attitudinal exposure 
within discussion networks. The sections below outline the characteristics I will examine, as well 
as the practical and theoretical context for my associated research questions.  
Partisanship. The predominant narrative in assessing the 2016 election and explaining 
the perceived surprise at Donald Trump’s victory asserted that individuals were divided into like-
minded political discussion networks that reaffirmed their own positions and failed to expose 
them to other views. In their study of the 2016 election, Stroud and Collier (2018) found that 
across both partisanship and ideology, left-leaning respondents were more likely to have entirely 
left-leaning networks than those on the right and vice-versa. This provides preliminary support 
for the claim that individuals tended to discuss politics with like-minded individuals. There is 
also work not specific to 2016 that might provide an idea of what to expect. A series of studies 
have demonstrated that discussion networks tend to be more homogenous in terms of party 
affiliation than the general population (Knoke, 1990; Lazer, Rubineau, Chetkovich, Katz, & 
Neblo, 2010; Marsden, 1987; Mutz, 2006; Sinclair, 2012). A study by Swann, Milton, and Polzer 
(2000) found that individuals formed groups with those who saw them as they saw themselves, 
resulting in groups with similar political positions.  
 To expand our insight into how discussion networks functioned during the 2016 election 
requires examining differences in degree of partisanship across respondent party affiliation. 
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Therefore I ask: 
 
RQ1a: Did political discussion network partisanship differ with ego’s party affiliation?  
Based on the literature, I would propose: 
H1a: Discussion network partisanship will have differed with ego’s party affiliation. 
 
However, much of the media narrative surrounding the 2016 election outcome and the 
surprise at Trump’s victory focused not just on partisan sorting but also on the idea of echo 
chambers in which individuals only talked to like-minded individuals. Less research has 
examined the degree to which alters’ partisan distance from ego differed by partisanship. A study 
by Mutz (2002a) that examined tolerance for individuals with dissonant views did not find 
evidence to suggest a difference in tolerance between Democrats/liberals or 
Republicans/conservatives.  
Despite media attention to partisan division, is not clear that partisan sorting is the direct 
result of choosing partners with similar political positions. While individuals tend to be relatively 
homogenous in terms of partisanship relative to the broader population, a study by Mutz (2002a) 
found no clear difference in comfort with ideologically dissonant others based on partisanship.  
Furthermore, individuals frequently have discussions – sometimes discussions they would rather 
avoid – based on circumstance rather than based on shared views (Mcpherson et al., 2001). A 
number of additional factors have been investigated as means of partisan sorting, including 
income, race, education, and gender, and these demographic characteristics were also frequently 
cited in understanding the 2016 election.  To assess whether the degree to which alters’ presented 
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counter-attitudinal perspectives varied with party affiliation, I ask: 
 
RQ1b: Did political discussion network partisan distance from ego differ with ego’s party 
affiliation?  
   
Gender. Gender was one of the most frequently discussed aspects of the 2016 election, 
both because of Hillary Clinton’s status as the first female presidential nominee by a major 
political party and because of the perception that Donald Trump was particularly sexist both 
prior to and during the campaign. After the election, pundits questioned whether women, who 
were believed to be more Democratic in general and who were thought to be particularly put off 
by Trump during the campaign,  were to blame for Clinton’s loss (e.g. Fox, 2016; Newton-Small, 
2016) despite the fact that a majority of women voted for her (Foran, 2016). Some suggested that 
while gender was one identifying factor that brought people together in support of Hillary, others 
such as ethnicity played a larger role. 
In her work on understanding which demographic factors contribute to partisan sorting, 
Sinclair (2012) suggests that gender and its relationship to partisan identity may play a role in the 
development of ideologically homogenous networks. Similarly, Feld (1982) suggests that many 
opportunities for developing relationships arise as a result of shared demographics including 
gender. But unlike other characteristics associated with partisan sorting (see below) gender is 
less likely to lead to geographical sorting, and Marsden found that while core discussion 
networks tended to be homogeneous in terms of socio-demographic factors, they were not more 
homogeneous in terms of gender (1987). Still, the American workplace is still often divided by 
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gender (Sinclair, 2012), and gendered norms relating to familial care and job choice could lead 
women to interact with others who have similar political motivations based on their roles as 
caretakers or in feminine-coded fields. In order to address the idea that women were more likely 
to discuss politics in Democratic networks, I ask: 
 
RQ2a: Did political discussion network partisanship differ with ego’s gender?  
 
However, understanding how political discussion networks function across gender 
requires knowing not only whether women are more likely to find themselves in Democratic 
networks. It is also important to know whether women are more likely to find themselves in 
more-likeminded networks that give result in stronger echo chambers, making them more likely 
to unite against Trump without taking other positions into consideration as expected by media 
coverage (or perhaps whether men were more isolated from perspectives that would challenge 
their support of Trump). To address the level of partisan distance between respondents and their 
networks across gender, I ask: 
 
RQ2b: Did political discussion network partisan distance from ego differ with ego’s gender? 
 
Race/Ethnicity. Another factor that has been frequently linked to partisan sorting is 
ethnicity. Media coverage of the election largely treated ethnic minorities as monolithic in-
groups likely to vote based on their race and presumed relationship to those who would be 
impacted by candidates’ policies, or communities with whom candidates tried to connect but did 
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not truly reach (e.g. Cohn, 2016; Williams, 2016, respectively). This coverage frequently noted 
geographical sorting by race in its analysis.  
Because of social structures in place within the US, race and ethnicity lead to substantial 
sorting in terms of geography, work, and social groups. The coincidence of race and partisan 
homogeneity is evident in multiple studies (e.g. Knoke, 1990; Lazer et al., 2010). Knoke notes, 
for example, that black Americans are more likely to be embedded in communities with a large 
percentage of Democratic partisans. Sinclair (2012) suggests that 79 percent of alters in political 
discussion networks are of the same race as ego. If there is a link between race and partisanship, 
network partisanship would be likely to vary by ego’s race.  Therefore, I ask: 
 
RQ3a: Did political discussion network partisanship differ with ego’s ethnicity?  
 
Even if there is a difference in network partisanship based upon ethnicity, that does not 
necessarily mean that members of some ethnicities are more likely to be in more like-minded 
networks than those who identify as other ethnicities. This is particularly of interest given the 
possibility that different ethnicities might experience different levels of partisan sorting, whether 
because of social impetus, associations between class and race, or numbers of minorities within a 
given area. In order to evaluate the degree of like-mindedness among alters across ethnicity I 
ask: 
 
RQ3b: Did political discussion network partisan distance from ego differ with ego’s ethnicity? 
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 Income. Another demographic factor associated with partisan discussion networks is 
income. Leading up to the election, much was made of the ways in which a “coastal elite” was 
ignorant to the plight of the white working class in “middle America,” and the idea that these two 
groups existed so separately from one another was used to explain how each could arrive at an 
entirely different set of conclusions. Despite this, however, Mutz (2018) found that economic 
hardship was not a primary motivating factor in voters’ choice to support Donald Trump, 
suggesting that the role of income in the election may have been more limited to geographical 
sorting. 
Partisan sorting based on income has been documented extensively (e.g. Knoke, 1990, 
2010; Sinclair, 2012), though it has primarily been theorized to operate via the places individuals 
work and the neighborhoods they live in, rather than specifically through individuals seeking out 
alters based on perceived economic status, especially as research has shown that individuals are 
more likely to actively select based on visible markers (Goeree et al., 2017), and multiple studies 
have not found support for direct selection based on income. 
 
RQ4a: Did political discussion network partisanship differ with ego’s income?  
 
Financial success often allows greater access to exclusive groups and more flexibility in terms of 
where one lives and works. As a result, it is possible that individuals with different 
incomes might have different levels of control over the environments in which they build 
discussion networks. If higher income allows individuals to select for groups and 
environments where individuals share their perspectives, it might by extension result in 
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lower levels of difference within political discussion networks. To explore this 
possibility, I ask: 
 
RQ4b: Did political discussion network partisan distance from ego differ with ego’s income? 
 
Education. Similarly, education has been given as a factor in determining one’s political 
discussion networks. A number of post-election analyses suggested that education was the 
strongest predictor of presidential voting, with a variety of explanations (McGill, 2016; Silver, 
2016). These included: academia is a liberal bubble; education level is related to racial 
resentment; Trump’s emotional appeals work better with the less educated; education level is 
related to media-consumption practices; and complex combinations of the above. Education level 
as a factor in sorting has been suggested by previous work, with empirical research providing 
mixed results about related effects. Knoke (1990) found no significant relationship between 
education and partisan environment from which to select alters. Nevertheless, the idea remained 
that those with less education were likely to be in networks of Republican Trump supporters, 
while a higher educated liberal elite was supporting Clinton. Thus I ask: 
 
RQ5a: Did political discussion network partisanship differ with ego’s education?  
  
Seemingly contrary to the idea of an educated liberal elite existing within a partisan echo 
chamber, Mutz (2002a) found that educational level was a strong predictor of comfort with 
opposing views. On the other hand, Sinclair (2012) specifically suggests that educational 
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attainment is related to partisanship and can play a role in the development of homogeneous 
networks. Taken together these findings are not immediately consistent with any major narrative 
regarding the role of education in the election. Therefore, I ask: 
 
RQ5b: Did political discussion network partisan distance from ego differ with ego’s education? 
  
 The final dimension across which I examine discussion network composition differs from 
the rest in that it focuses on respondents’ perception of their connection to their alters rather than 
on a characteristic of respondents themselves. However, this element is important as it adds to 
our understanding of how the relationship between individual and alter relates to network 
makeup. 
Closeness. It is true that individuals are not always able to control conversations in social 
situations, and might at times end up discussing politics with individuals with whom they 
disagree even if they would prefer otherwise (Mcpherson et al., 2001). Nevertheless, there are 
cases in which individuals do select like-minded individuals if given the choice, such as when 
evaluating potential romantic partners. A study by Swann, Milton, and Polzer (2000) found that 
individuals formed groups with those who saw them as they saw themselves, resulting in groups 
with like-minded opinions, including on political matters. I investigate by asking: 
 
RQ6a: Was political discussion network partisanship related to network closeness? 
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It is not inconceivable that while citizens might encounter alters with a variety of 
perspective in their daily lives, they would choose to discuss matters they view as important with 
like-minded individuals and might give more weight to the opinions of those individuals to 
whom they felt closest. To evaluate whether political discussion networks comprised of stronger 
ties are more likely to be more partisan relative to ego, I also ask: 
 
RQ6b: Was political discussion network partisan distance from ego related to network 
closeness? 
 
Selective Exposure 
Selective exposure in the broadest sense has been theorized as far back as the late 19th 
century and began to enter the discourse of social science research around the time of 
Lazarsfeld’s early studies (e.g., P.F. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948).  
Existing Models. However, research on the matter began in earnest after the publication 
of  Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), which provided a theoretical 
mechanism through which the phenomenon could take place.  Festinger argues that individuals 
experience cognitive dissonance when they encounter ideas or information that is in conflict with 
their existing beliefs. He suggests that when the level of dissonance becomes uncomfortable 
enough, the individual is motivated to resolve the issue by seeking out information that reaffirms 
their existing beliefs and avoiding information that would increase uncertainty. This is most 
frequently applied to partisan selective exposure research through the argument that individuals 
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will seek out information that supports the party they believe to be better, avoiding information 
that would contradict this.  
Both Festinger and others have acknowledged the potential for other factors to contribute 
to selective exposure. For example, the cognitive miser model argues that because information 
contrary to existing beliefs is more difficult to process (Edwards & Smith, 1996), individuals 
may be motivated to conserve mental energy by avoiding information incongruent with existing 
beliefs. As a result, individuals less invested in politics or experiencing other factors that might 
cause fatigue would be less likely to seek out contradictory information. These individuals 
effectively practice selective behavior motivated not by beliefs themselves but by the desire to 
avoid the strain of intensive cognitive processing. In contrast to the cognitive miser model, others 
have suggested that most individuals attempt to pick the most accurate information available 
(Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008). However, individuals perceive like-minded information 
as more accurate (Lord et al., 1979; Sears, 1968). This means that individuals often practice 
selective exposure without conscious motivation in an attempt to find the most credible sources. 
Others have suggested that individuals were likely to seek information based on their hypotheses 
(Snyder, 1977) or attempt to seek congruent information in efforts to achieve closure. Arie 
Kruglanski’s (A. Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; A. W. Kruglanski, 1990) theory of lay epistemics 
provides a model for selective exposure based on motivations shaped by context. Kruglanski 
argues that individuals are driven by a need to find or avoid closure and a need for specific or 
nonspecific closure. This model suggests that in a specific context, individuals either want to 
reach a conclusion or avoid one and that the conclusion may be a specific one or any conclusion 
at all. Stroud (2011) outlines how this could be applied to partisan selective exposure 
21 
 
 
specifically: if an individual wants to avoid coming to a specific conclusion, s/he might avoid 
information that supports that position and seek out information that contradicts it. If an 
individual wants to avoid coming to a decision altogether, s/he might constantly seek out 
differing viewpoints to avoid coming to a conclusion. And if an individual wants to achieve a 
specific conclusion, s/he might seek out information that supports that particular position until 
they achieve closure. In each of these cases, the subject might be motivated by personal 
identification with a particular party or candidate, the desire to find an answer quickly, or the 
desire to achieve a specific position for social reasons. 
 Partisan Selective Exposure. Between Lazarsfeld et al.’s early work and more recent 
studies of selective exposure, the question of when and to what degree selective behavior takes 
place has been a contentious question. While doubts remain about the impact of selective 
exposure more broadly, a great deal of research has established the presence of selective 
exposure in the context of partisan politics, showing that individuals select for political news that 
they believe will be amenable to their own positions (Hart et al., 2009; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; 
Stroud, 2008, 2011). A proposed explanation for the relative strength of partisan selective 
exposure is that political identity is central to an individual’s social identity, increasing 
motivation to select for agreeable information (Slater, 2007; Stroud, 2010). 
Intersection. Relatively little research has been conducted on the relationship between 
political discussion networks and selective exposure. There is a clear intersection between levels 
of agreement in political discussion network and levels of partisan selective exposure, as both are 
strong predictors of partisanship/polarization. 
 Stroud (2010) infers that there is a direct relationship between homogeneous political 
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discussion networks and partisan selective exposure, as her work and (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & 
Osborn, 2004) link both phenomena directly to political polarization. Additionally, Stroud points 
out that the mechanisms through which political discussion networks are theorized to increase 
polarization (either exposure to strong arguments or by social pressure to conform) could be 
applied to media selection as well. 
 Yonghwan Kim (2015) extended this research, determining that exposure to diverse ideas 
through heterogeneous political discussion networks could mitigate the weaker polarizing effects 
of partisan selective exposure. Additionally, a quasi-experimental study by Jeffrey Mondak 
(1995) noted that partisan media could mitigate the effects of political discussion on individual 
voting behavior. Despite these suggestive findings, these studies do not assess the direct 
relationship between selective exposure and discussion network homogeneity. 
 Additionally, the integration of political discussion dynamics into the research on 
selective exposure has the potential to illuminate how different factors simultaneously contribute 
to selective behavior (or cancel one another out). Understanding the social context in which 
individuals practice selective exposure provides a means of assessing the potential for different 
motivations under the lay epistemics approach. More broadly, certain sources of information 
might be considered more socially acceptable within particular social networks, extending the 
aforementioned social pressures argument directly from the discussion network to the practice of 
selective exposure. 
 Despite the amount of existing work suggesting a potential link between network 
partisanship and selective exposure, I am not aware of any work that examines the relationship 
beyond descriptive analysis. To this end, I ask the following question and propose a hypothesis 
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based on existing research and theory: 
 
RQ7a: What is the relationship between network partisanship and subsequent selective 
exposure? 
 
Based on the findings of Kim (2015) and Mondak (1995), it is likely that partisan 
selective exposure and political discussion network homogeneity have combined effects. To the 
degree that political discussion networks are not chosen based on political beliefs, it is unlikely 
that the two are mutually reinforcing. However, additional research might examine how political 
discussion networks act as channels for information, contributing to Slater’s (2007) reinforcing 
spirals. This is also consistent with Shah et al’s  (2017) Revised Communication Mediation 
Model, which suggests that extreme partisan media and extreme partisan discussion create a 
cycle of increasing partisanship and distrust in opposing positions. Extant research does not 
suggest that those with one party affiliation are more likely to practice selective exposure than 
those with another (though strength of partisanship may be related to levels of selective 
behavior). Thus I propose: 
 
H7b: Partisanship of political discussion networks will have a negative relationship with 
subsequent selective exposure.  
 
In order to understand the directionality of a potential relationship between network 
composition and partisan selective exposure, I also address the above questions by asking: 
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RQ7c: What is the relationship between selective exposure and subsequent network 
partisanship? 
RQ7d: What is the relationship between selective exposure and subsequent network partisan 
distance from ego? 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
Because of the nature of the alleged political polarization, nationwide data are necessary 
in order to assess whether insulated discussion and consumption exist, as studies within specific 
communities might obscure the effects relative to the general population. Some previous work on 
selective exposure has been conducted via experiment and thus has limited ability to reflect real-
world practices in which users do not always engage with news or do so in a setting where they 
are either directly primed for a particular response or entirely uninfluenced. Additional research 
drawing from representative survey data will help provide a realistic view of selective exposure 
in practice. 
Sample  
This project relies primarily on quantitative analysis of data from the Texas Media and 
Society Survey (TMASS), which is a cross-sectional nationwide survey conducted during and 
after the 2016 US presidential campaign. Data include demographic factors such as age, race, 
gender, educational attainment, and location, with oversampling of the Texas population. 
 Most existing literature on discussion networks and selective exposure draws on surveys 
that ask respondents about the networks of individuals with whom they discuss “important 
matters.” While there is evidence to suggest that core discussion networks as discovered using 
the important matters metric are suitable for studies of political discussion, especially during 
election years (Klofstad et al., 2009), TMASS circumvents this challenge by inquiring 
specifically about those with whom respondents discuss political matters and asking a series of 
follow-up questions to assess possible partisanship of those alters. One potential risk associated 
with specifically asking about political discussion is that individuals will recall individuals with 
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whom they have talked about politics even if they do not consider them core discussion partners. 
TMASS phrased the question as follows: 
From time to time, people discuss government, elections, and politics with 
other people. We’d like to know the first names or just the initials of people you 
talk with about these matters. These people might be from your family, from 
work, from the neighborhood, from some other organization you belong to, or 
they might be from somewhere else. Who is the person you’ve talked with most 
about politics? Aside from this person, who else have you talked with about 
politics?   
It is possible – especially during an election year when discussion of politics is more 
omnipresent than usual – that individuals will include individuals who are not their core 
political discussion partners, particularly given the wording of the inquiry about the 
second and third alters. In this case, asking individuals with whom they talk most about 
politics might include individuals who would not be as likely to be included in response 
to an “important matters” prompt. While this is unlikely to happen often when only 
considering the three alters with whom one talks most, it is an advantage of asking about 
political discussion partners specifically. 
Another potential limitation of the TMASS survey is that it only asks for up to 
three alters, and respondents with a larger core discussion network would not be able to 
report more. However, most research on the size of core discussion networks suggests 
that the average American has less than three key discussion partners (Klofstad et al., 
2009; Marsden, 1987), so it is likely that any missing data are minimal. 
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The first portion of this project uses data collected in the spring of 2016 to assess the state 
of political discussion networks during the presidential campaign (N=2015). At the time the data 
were collected, Donald Trump had already become the presumptive Republican presidential 
nominee. While Hillary Clinton achieved the required number of votes to become the 
presumptive Democratic nominee during data collection, she was easily outpacing Sanders prior 
to the start of the survey. Of those surveyed 1,752 provided data about their own partisan leaning 
and the leanings of their political discussion partners, both of which are necessary to determine 
network partisan distance from ego. (Table 1) 
To answer RQ3, the project draws on data collected in both 2016 and 2017 to assess the 
potential impact of partisan discussion networks over time. Data were collected on 1,267 of the 
original respondents, 1,024 of whom reported data on their discussion partners. (Table 2). 
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Table 1: 2016 Ego Demographics 
Variable Mean or Valid% Std. dev. Min Max N 
Age 51.5 16.552 18 93 2015 
       18-29 12.10% 
   
2015 
       30-44 23.20% 
   
2015 
       45-59 29.00% 
   
2015 
       60+ 35.70% 
   
2015 
Gender 
     
       Male 48.70% 
   
2015 
       Female 51.30% 
   
2015 
Race/Ethnicity 
     
       White, Non-Hispanic 62.50% 
   
2015 
       Black, Non-Hispanic 9.00% 
   
2015 
       Other, Non-Hispanic 7.80% 
   
2015 
       Hispanic 20.70% 
   
2015 
Party Preference 
     
       Democrats 51.00% 
   
2015 
       Republicans 45.40% 
   
2015 
       Neither/Depends 3.60% 
   
2015 
Education 
     
       Less than High School 10.80% 
   
2015 
       High School 26.30% 
   
2015 
       Some College 27.60% 
   
2015 
       Bachelor's or Higher 35.30% 
   
2015 
Income 
     
       $0-24,999 16.70% 
   
2015 
       $25,000-74,999 39.70% 
   
2015 
       $75,000+ 43.60% 
   
2015 
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Table 2: 2017 Ego Demographics 
Variable Mean or Valid% Std. dev. Min Max N 
Age 53.74 16.19 19 74 1267 
       18-29 12.1%    1267 
       30-44 23.2%    1267 
       45-59 29.0%    1267 
       60+ 35.7%    1267 
Gender      
       Male 52.4%    1267 
       Female 47.6%    1267 
Race/Ethnicity      
       White, Non-Hispanic 67.3%    1267 
       Black, Non-Hispanic 8.4%    1267 
       Other, Non-Hispanic 8.5%    1267 
       Hispanic 16%    1267 
Party Preference      
       Democrats 48.9%    1267 
       Republicans 47.5%    1267 
       Neither/Depends 3.7%    1267 
Education      
       Less than High School 5.9%    1267 
       High School 25.9%    1267 
       Some College 29.8%    1267 
       Bachelor's or Higher 38.4%    1267 
Income      
       $0-24,999 14.8%    1267 
       $25,000-74,999 40.51%    1267 
       $75,000+ 44.7%    1267 
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Measures 
Network Partisanship. Ego’s partisanship was reported on a 7-point scale, which was 
then recoded to a 3-point scale where “Republican” refers to respondents in the categories 
“Strong Republican,” Not Strong Republican” and “Leans Republican”; “Democrat” refers to 
those in the categories “Strong Democrat,” “Not Strong Democrat,” and “Leans Democrat;” and 
the remaining respondents listed as “Independent/Undecided.” The “Independent/Undecided” 
group makes up only 3.6 percent of valid responses and is excluded from the analysis, though it 
has been included in additional tests as a means of checking robustness where appropriate (see 
footnotes in Results).  Partisanship scores for all reported alters were averaged to create a 
network partisanship score ranging from 1 to 3, where 1 is the most Republican network possible 
and 3 is the most Democratic network possible. In 2016 (M = 1.96 SD = 0.65), 40.2% of 
respondents found themselves in networks of alters that skewed Republican while 34% found 
themselves in networks that skewed Democratic.  In 2017 (M = 1.99 SD = 0.66), 42.6% of 
respondents found themselves in networks of alters that leaned Republican and  35.6% found 
themselves in networks that leaned Democratic. 
Network Partisan Distance. Network partisan distance (from ego) describes the 
ideological diversity of respondents’ discussion networks relative to the respondent themselves. 
Partisan distance from ego was measured by scoring each alter on the same scale 3-point scale, 
subtracting each alter score from ego score, and averaging the difference. This generated a score 
for each ego on a scale of 0 to 2, where 0 represents a network in which all alters share ego’s 
partisan identification, and 2 represents a network in which all alters have been affiliated with the 
party opposite of that with which ego is associated.  
31 
 
 
 Measures of partisan distance have not historically been used within the literature on 
political discussion networks, which have frequently instead used measures of difference in 
agreement/disagreement, proportion disagreed, network ambivalence, or Simpson’s D to 
describe the partisan environment of political discussion networks (R. Lupton & Thornton, 
2017). Lupton et al. suggest the use of Nir’s formula (2005) for ambivalence when two groups 
are present and Simpson’s D when three groups are present. While this may be appropriate in 
situations where a third party or independent alter acts in a way entirely discrete from the other 
political parties, it would give alters listed as “neither/depends” equal weighting to those of the 
opposite party in terms of representing an additional viewpoint. Because I am primarily 
concerned with exposure to dissonant information, this is not necessarily the best treatment for 
the neither/depends group in my study, and I opt to use simple averages instead (though as 
Lupton et al. point out, this means a network with one opposite-party alter and one same party 
alter would receive the same score as one with two neither/depends alters; I have deemed this a 
better compromise for my purposes). 
 In 2016, respondents networks mean network partisan distance score was 0.60 (SD=.53), 
suggesting that individuals’ networks tended to share their partisan biases. The mean score in 
2017 was 0.58 (SD=.53), meaning that this tendency continued. 
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Table	3:	Network	Partisan	Distance	(from	Ego)	
	
Score 2016 (%) 2017 (%) 
.00 30.8 33.1 
.33 12.3 11.7 
.50 3.8 3.9 
.67 16.2 15.9 
1.00 24.7 23.5 
1.33 6.7 6.7 
1.50 1.1 1.1 
1.67 2.2 1.7 
2.00 2.4 2.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 Race/Ethnicity. Race/ethnicity was reported by respondents, who were asked to self-
identify themselves as black (9.0%), white (62.5%) Hispanic (20.7%), 2+ races, or other (7.8%, 
combined). Due to the small number of respondents who chose 2+ races or “other,” the two 
categories were condensed for the purpose of this thesis.  
Income. Income was defined in three categories. Respondents initially identified 
themselves as belonging to one of 14 income brackets. For the purposes of addressing my 
research questions, I condensed these brackets into low-, middle- and upper-income categories 
based on Pew metrics utilized in reporting of the 2016 election. Pew did not report national 
average income brackets for 2016, instead employing a system that relied on specifics of location 
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and family size. However, reports from Pew during the 2016 campaign season used brackets 
based on the system used in 2014. Those earning less than $25,000 were categorized as low-
income (16.7%), those earning between $25,000 and $75,000 were categorized as middle-
income (39.7%), and those earning more than $75,000 were categorized as upper-income 
(43.6%). The same metric has been applied for the purposes of analysis here. 
Education. Level of education was defined by respondent self-identification. Individuals 
were classified as having less than high school education (10.8%), high school education 
(26.3%), some college education (27.6%), or at least a bachelor’s degree (35.3%)  
Agreement. Network agreement is measured by averaging respondent self-assessments 
of how much they disagreed with each alter. For each alter, respondents could choose: All of the 
time, most of the time, half of the time, hardly ever, and never. Scores were recoded to represent 
agreement and averaged to provide a network agreement score ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 
representing the most agreement). The mean network agreement score was 3.57 (SD = .75) 
suggesting individuals tended to agree slightly with their alters on average. 
Closeness. Network closeness was measured by averaging respondent self-assessment of 
closeness to each alter. Respondents could describe their relationship with alters as “very close,” 
“close,” “fairly close,” “not too close,” or “not close at all.” These responses were coded on a 5-
point scale and averaged, producing a measure for network closeness with a scale of 1 to 5 where 
5 represents the most closeness between ego and their network. The mean network closeness 
score was 3.86 (SD = .75) suggesting individuals tended to discuss politics with those to whom 
they felt closer, rather than with those to whom they felt less close. 
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Selective Exposure. Partisan selective exposure requires a slightly more complex 
working definition. The degree of selective exposure can be measured by self-reported 
consumption of media text with a bias favoring the respondent’s stated political orientation. 
Drawing on related work by Stroud and Collier (2018) using TMASS, I categorize the partisan 
bias of media based on user perception, treating sources that more than 50% of users rated as 
having a liberal bias (MSNBC, CNN, The New York Times and NPR) as liberal and sources that 
more than 50% of users felt had a conservative bias (The Rush Limbaugh Show, Fox News, and 
The Drudge Report) as conservative. For Republicans, individuals were scored as exhibiting 
selective behavior if they consumed at least one of the conservative sources and no liberal 
sources. For Democrats, respondents exhibited selective behavior if they consumed at least one 
of the liberal sources and no conservative sources.  For the purpose of this thesis, selective 
exposure is a binary variable. In 2016, 35.7 percent of individuals practiced selective exposure 
while 64.3 did not, and in 2017, 44.0 percent of respondents practiced selective exposure while 
56.0 did not (using this measure). 
 
Limitations 
While working with survey data has advantages in terms of collecting large quantities of 
information easily and gathering information about how individuals behave in the real world 
rather than in designed experimental conditions, relying on self-reported data presents its own 
challenges. Ensuring that questions are worded such that responses are valid can be challenging 
when working with such a large, diverse population (See Appendix A for relevant questions 
from the Texas Media and Society Survey; questions only used to describe the sample in Tables 
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1 and 2 have been omitted for brevity). Furthermore, individuals’ memories are not always 
accurate, and the ability to accurately assess news sources and alters may vary from person to 
person. 
Perceptions of Alters. I rely on respondents’ assessments of their alters’ party affiliation 
and political opinions to construct measures of agreement and of network partisan distance from 
ego. Mutz & Martin (2001) find that individuals have a reasonable ability to assess their alters’ 
party affiliation, with a tendency to err toward in the direction of their own party affiliation when 
they do make mistakes. Further, Mutz and Martin argue that in some cases the perception of 
similarity is more important than actual similarity because the potential effects of partisan 
similarity or difference within the network are likely to rely on how respondents perceiving their 
alters (or their alters’ positions). While there is some room for respondents to perceive alters as 
sharing similar party affiliation but having different perspectives, the general accuracy of 
perception paired with the greater importance given to perception makes these reports 
appropriate for use in this thesis. 
Perception of Media Bias and Use. Additionally, my analysis uses several survey 
questions to construct scores for partisan selective exposure. First, I adopt Stroud & Collier ‘s 
(2018)  method of using respondent perceptions to categorize media sources as partisan. Because 
respondents’ ability to accurately assess bias is limited (Mutz & Martin, 2001) – in fact some 
models of selective exposure presume an inability to accurately assess bias - Stroud and Collier 
propose using summary measures, where media outlets are labeled partisan when more than 50% 
of those using them recognize them as having a conservative or liberal slant. Ultimately, this 
measure is perhaps conservative, as individuals may be less likely to consume news they 
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perceive as biased and more likely to see news biased in accordance with their beliefs as 
accurate.  
Next, I rely on self-reporting of media consumed in the two weeks prior to administration 
of the survey. Empirical analysis has shown that self-reports of news media consumption may 
not be accurate (Prior, 2009), though subsequent work has argued that an approach focusing on 
which sources were consumed rather than in what quantity they are consumed can still be 
appropriate (Dilliplane, Goldman, & Mutz, 2013; see also critique from  Prior, 2013; and 
argument from Goldman, Mutz, & Dilliplane, 2013, that this is the best available method). 
Breadth. Finally, one limitation is that while the survey collects data on a large sample, it 
is limited in how much data can be collected from each individual. Respondents were given the 
option to list up to 3 alters, and while that is reasonably close to historical averages for core 
network size (Marsden, 1987; Mcpherson, Smith-lovin, & Brashears, 2005), it does mean that 
not all alters are recorded. Additionally, respondents were asked about a pre-established list of 
possible media outlets, meaning that not all possible media sources were included in this 
analysis. Still, analysis using the alters and media outlets reported on is sufficient to give 
preliminary insight into network composition and selective behavior. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
Network Composition 
Ego Partisanship. To assess RQ1a, that network partisanship would differ with ego 
partisanship, respondents were separated into Democrat-leaning and Republican-leaning.2 Data 
was collected for 1720 individuals who provided data on both their own partisan identity and that 
of at least one alter. An independent samples t-test was conducted to check for differences in 
network partisanship by ego partisanship. Supporting H1a, results showed a statistically 
significant difference t(1,1718)=-30.904, p<.001, where Republicans had more Republican-
leaning networks (1.56) and Democrats had more Democratic-leaning networks (2.34). 
A second independent samples t-test was conducted to assess RQ1b, whether there was a 
difference in the network partisan distance from ego between Republicans and Democrats. This 
test showed a statistically significant difference (1,1718)= 3.563, p<.001, where Republicans had 
less diverse networks relative to ego (.561) than Democrats had (.66).  
Gender. To answer RQ2a regarding whether network partisanship differed with gender an 
independent samples t-test was used to assess differences in the same measure of network 
partisanship by gender. The results showed no significant difference (1,1718)=.550 p<.001, in 
network partisanship between men (1.94) and women (1.98). 
                                                             
2 As a robustness check, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used to assess difference in network partisan diversity across ego 
partisan identities when the “neither/depends” group is included (giving a significant result for Levene’s test, p<.05). 
Results were significant χ2(2) = 33.07, p <.001. Post-hoc pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test showed significant 
differences between each group. 
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In response to RQ2b, a second t-test was conducted to assess for difference in network 
partisan distance from ego across genders. Results of this test showed no significant difference in 
network partisans distance from ego between men (.61) and women (.59), t(1750) = .794, p = 
.427.  
Race/Ethnicity. Addressing RQ3a, whether network partisanship would vary with ethnicity, 
data were collected for 1131 individuals and, because Levene’s test had a significant result 
(p<.01), a Kruskal-Wallis Test was conducted. Results showed statistically significant 
differences in network partisanship by ethnicity, N= 1782, χ2(3) = 233.04, p <.001. Post-hoc 
pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test showed statistically significant differences between 
network partisanship of all groups, with  white (1.80)  having more Republican networks than  
“other” (1.96) respondents, which had more Republican networks than Hispanic (2.26) 
respondents, which in turn had more Republican networks than black (2.45) respondents. This is 
consistent with H3a. 
To assess RQ3b, that network partisan distance from ego would differ with ethnicity, data 
were collected for 1131 individuals who provided data on both their own partisan identity and 
that of at least one alter. Again, Levene’s Test was significant (p<.01), and Kruskal-Wallis was 
used to assess the difference in network partisan distance across ego partisan identities: N=1752,  
χ2(3) = 14.51, p <.05.  Post-hoc pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test showed a significant 
difference between those who identified as “other”/more than one ethnicity, and those who 
identified as black or white, with black (.53) and white(.59) respondents having lower network 
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partisan diversity scores than those in the “other” category (.76). 3  These findings are consistent 
with H3b suggesting difference in network partisan diversity based on ethnicity.                 
Income. Using data from 1782 respondents, a Kruskal-Wallis test (Levene’s test: p<.001) 
was used to assess RQ4a: whether network partisanship differed by income during the 2016 
election. Results showed a statistically significant difference in network partisanship across 
income levels, χ2(2) = 21.71, p <.001. 
 Post-hoc pairwise comparison using Dunns’ test showed that lower-income respondents 
had more Democratic networks (2.14) than did middle- (1.96) or upper-income (1.90) 
respondents. 
An ANOVA was conducted to assess RQ4b: whether there was a difference in network 
partisan distance across income brackets (as defined by Pew4). Results showed a statistically 
significant difference across income brackets F(2,1749)=9.35, p<.001. Post hoc testing showed a 
significant difference between Lower Income respondents (.72) and Middle Income (.60) or 
Upper Income (.56) respondents. 
Education. To assess RQ5a, an ANOVA was conducted to assess whether network 
partisanship differed with education levels. The results showed a statistically significant 
difference F(3,1749)=14.57, p<.001, and post-hoc Bonferroni comparison demonstrated that 
                                                             
3 Here one-way ANOVA also shows a different between Hispanic (.62) and “Other”(.76) respondents as well. 
4 Pew estimates of income for individuals take into consideration a variety of factors including where one lives. In 
writing about the 2016 election Pew cites generalized statistics for individuals from 2014, which fit to our survey 
questions place the lower-/middle-income divide at $25000 and $75000, though these numbers do not take into 
account family size. 
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those with less than a high school education had more Democratic (2.25) networks than those 
with a high school education (1.99), those with some college (1.90) and those with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher (1.91). 
In response to RQ5b, Kruskal-Wallis (and ANOVA) was conducted to assess whether 
there was a difference in network partisan distance across education levels. Results showed no 
statistically significant difference across education.  χ2(3) = 4.47, p =.22. H5b, that partisan 
distance from ego would have varied with educational attainment, is not supported. 
Closeness.  Addressing RQ6a, there was no statistically significant relationship between 
network partisanship and network closeness. However, in response to RQ6b there was a 
statistically significant but weak negative correlation between network closeness and network 
partisan distance, r(1751)= -.159, p<.01. This can be understood as individuals who are closer to 
their alters (on average) also having had more similar partisan affiliation to their network average 
than those who are less close to their alters had.  
Selective Exposure 
A two-stage hierarchical logistic regression was used to assess RQ7a (see table 6). Demographic 
factors, as well as network closeness and agreement, were entered in the first before network 
partisanship was added in the second stage. Results did not suggest a relationship between 
network partisanship and subsequent levels of selective exposure (B = -0.18, SE = 0.13, p >.05). 
 Addressing H7b, another hierarchical logistic regression was conducted. Again, 
demographic factors and network closeness and agreement were controlled for in the first stage, 
with network partisan distance from ego being added in the second phase. Results are consistent 
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with H7b, finding a statistically significant negative relationship between network partisan 
distance from ego and subsequent selective exposure, (B = -0.625, SE = 0.14, p <.001). 
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Table	4:	Relationship	of	Selective	Exposure	to	Subsequent	Network	Composition	
Model 
Selective Exposure 
(Partisanship Model) 
Selective Exposure  
(Partisan Distance Model)  
B se B se 
 
     
Network Closeness .198** .070 .198** .070 
Network Agreement -.102 .092 -.102 .092 
Party Affiliation 
(Republican as Reference):     
                 Democrat -.340 .138 -.340 .138 
Age .031*** .004 .031*** .004 
Income .178 .106 .178 .106 
Education .363*** .078 .363*** .078 
Ethnicity 
(White as Reference):     
                 Black .084 .240 .084 .240 
                 Hispanic -.656* .329 -.656* .329 
                 Other -.647* .300 -.647* .300 
Gender 
(Male as Reference):     
                 Female -.295* .134 -.295* .134 
 Constant (Block 1) -3.279*** .613 -3.279*** .613 
 Nagelkerke R2 (Block 1) .159***  .159***  
 
 
 
 
 
 Network Closeness .205** .070 8.445 .072 
 Network Agreement -.096 .092 -.230* .098 
 
Party Affiliation 
(Republican as Reference):     
                  Democrat -.472** .167 -.447** .142 
 Age .031*** .004 .031*** .004 
 Income .180 .106 .136 .108 
 Education .362*** .078   
 
Ethnicity 
(White as Reference):     
                  Black .084 .240 .014 .244 
                  Hispanic -.588 .332 -.867*** .338 
                  Other -.601* .302 -.771*** .306 
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Table	4,	cont.	
 
Gender 
(Male as Reference):     
                  Female -.302* .135 -.274* .136 
 Network Partisanship -.183 .129   
 Network Partisan Distance   -.625*** .136 
 Constant (Block 2) -2.92***  -2.111 .664 
 Nagelkerke R2 (Block 2) .162***  .182***  
 R2 Change .003  .023***  
      
 N 1094  1094  
 
a. Dependent Variable: Selective Exposure    
*    p<.05 
**   p<.01 
***   p<.001 
 
 
A third hierarchical regression was conducted to assess the relationship between selective 
exposure and subsequent network partisanship. Results suggest a statistically significant 
relationship between selective exposure and subsequent network partisanship, where higher 
levels of selective exposure were associated with more Democrat discussion networks, F(1, 
1016) = 0.06, p = .804. 
 A final hierarchical regression was conducted to test H7d, controlling for demographic 
factors as well as network closeness and agreement. Results did not support H7d, indicating no 
relationship between selective exposure subsequent network partisan distance from ego, F(1, 
1013) .001, p = .30. 
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Table	5:	Relationship	of	Selective	Exposure	to	Subsequent	Network	Composition	
Model 
Network Partisanship  Network Partisan Distance  
b se b se 
 Network Closeness .063* (.018) -.080* (.017) 
 Network Agreement .029 (.023) -.215*** (.023) 
 Party Affiliation 
(Republican as Reference):     
                  Democrat .567*** (.034) .064* (.067) 
 Age -.030 (.001) -.068* (.001) 
 Income .020 (.027) -.061 (.026) 
 Education .004 (.019) -.032 (.019) 
 Ethnicity 
(White as Reference):     
      
                  Black .146*** (.065) -.093** (.063) 
                  Hispanic .111*** (.051) -.008 (.049) 
                  Other .025 (.061) .091** (.059) 
 Gender 
(Male as Reference):     
                 Female -.005 (.034) -.017 (.032) 
Constant (Block 1) 1.263*** (.147) 1.566*** (.142) 
Adjusted R2 (Block 1) .407***  .077***  
 
Constant (Block 1) 1.263***  1.566*** (.142) 
Adjusted R2 (Block 1) .407***  .077***  
     
Network Closeness .062* (.018) -.079* (.017) 
Network Agreement .029 (.023) -.217*** (.023) 
Party Affiliation 
(Republican as Reference):     
                 Democrat .567*** (.036) .064* (.067) 
Age -.031 (.001) -.066* (.001) 
Income .020 (.027) -.061 .026 
Education .003 (.020) -.028 (.019) 
Ethnicity 
(White as Reference):     
                 Black .146*** (.065) -.093** (.063) 
                 Hispanic .112*** (.051) -.009 (.049) 
                 Other .024 (.061) .093** (.059) 
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Table 5, cont 
 Gender 
(Male as Reference):     
                 Female -.004 (.034) -.021 (.033) 
 Selective Exposure .006 (.035) -.032 (.033) 
 Constant (Block 2) 1.262***  1.572*** (.142) 
 Adjusted R2 (Block 2) .407***  .077***  
 R2 Change .000  .001  
      
 N 1026  1024  
 
b. Dependent Variable: Selective Exposure    
*    p<.05 
**    p<.01 
***    p<.001 
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
Media narratives surrounding politics focus heavily on assumptions about the behavior of 
certain demographic groups. When faced with unexpected outcomes, pundits often focus on how 
these groups deviated from expectations or how those predicting elections failed to understand 
particular group dynamics. In the case of the 2016 presidential election, much of this discussion 
focused on how the liberal and Democratic groups to which much of the mainstream media 
allegedly belonged failed to interact with and understand those on the other side, because they 
were trapped in their own bubbles of liberal discussion and news. These echoed complaints from 
the political right throughout the campaign, which argued that Democrats and the liberal media 
did not understand what “real America” wanted and needed. The following analysis breaks down 
each finding in terms of its implications within the context of the 2016 election and what it adds 
to our broader understanding of political discussion networks and selective exposure. 
Network Composition 
Examining discussion networks during the 2016 presidential campaign, I first asked 
whether network partisanship differed with ego’s party affiliation (RQ1). My findings support 
the hypothesis that individuals tend to discuss politics with others who have political views 
similar to their own. Whether due to sorting based on sociodemographic factors or because of 
active choice of politically like-minded alters, this finding is consistent with previous literature 
(Knoke, 1990; Lazer et al., 2010; Mutz, 2006; Sinclair, 2012) that suggests homogeneity in terms 
of party affiliation. To the degree that the mainstream media is, in fact, liberal this is also 
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consistent with the idea that media pundits may have been likely to have core discussion partners 
who reaffirmed their own perspectives rather than exposing them to opposing views5. 
However, in addressing whether partisan distance varies with ego partisanship (RQ2), 
analysis indicates that while homogeny existed regardless of party affiliation, Republicans had 
more ideologically homogenous networks than Democrats did. One theoretical explanation for 
this focuses on how political parties are organized. It has been posited that the Democratic Party 
has acted as a form of political coalition bringing together diverse identities and perspectives to 
support common interests, while the Republican Party has been more ideologically consistent in 
its makeup, with most GOP voters sharing a set of core beliefs. This explanation is expanded 
upon in work on political operatives by Glaser & Berry (2018), who suggest that Republicans 
tend to be more invested in core ideals and less open to compromise. As a result, we might 
imagine that Democrats would be more open to discuss politics with those who have different 
perspectives. However, it is also possible that these results stem from other factors that coincide 
with partisanship and lead to sorting independently of party identity, and additional research is 
needed to determine the cause of this difference. 
Regardless of the causal factor, these results should not be interpreted as a rejection of the 
idea that liberal groups may have been insulating themselves from conservative perspectives – 
both sides showed levels of partisan distance that suggest some form of partisan sorting (though 
                                                             
5 How one defines liberal media sources might also affect these findings. The method employed from Stroud & 
Collier (2018) results in only 3 conservative and 4 liberal sources for the sake of this analysis. Additionally, pundits 
may not discuss politics in a manner typical of the American population. 
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not necessarily on the basis of partisanship specifically). Instead, this suggests that this sorting 
was taking place on both sides. Future studies on the impact of ideological insulation on political 
outcomes should consider both how lack of exposure to certain views can create network-wide 
blindspots and how consistent reinforcing of a particular position can lead to political strength, 
rather than examining each effect in isolation without considering the larger system. 
Despite the fact that women were more likely to identify as Democrats6 than as 
Republicans and the fact that men were more likely to identify as Republicans than as 
Democrats, when addressing whether network partisanship differed with gender (RQ2a), results 
showed that there was no difference in mean network partisanship between men and women, 
suggesting women were not more likely to pick Democratic discussion partners than men or vice 
versa. This echoes Marsden’s (1987) findings and is consistent with the idea that any indirect 
partisan sorting takes place based on socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors that lead to 
geographic sorting in ways that gender typically would not. It seems that gendered sorting by 
workplace or social-group either does not have a partisan sorting effect or is not strong enough 
for the effect to be significant. 
RQ2b asked whether network partisan distance from ego varied with gender. Results 
show no difference in network partisan distance between men and women. This finding is 
particularly interesting in light of political coverage in response to the Trump campaign that 
presented women as a group likely to unite against Trump’s perceived sexism, as it suggests that 
women were not more likely to find themselves in political echo chambers where their partisan 
views were likely to be strongly reinforced. 
                                                             
6 χ2(1, N=1910) = 7.0761, p <.01. 
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RQ3a asked whether network partisanship differed with race and ethnicity. The finding 
that network partisanship differed with race and ethnicity such that minority respondents tended 
to find themselves in more democratic discussion networks is consistent with previous literature 
on partisan sorting (Knoke, 1990; Lazer et al., 2010). It also is consistent with the media 
narrative that racial division contributed to political division and insularity during the campaign 
cycle, a position supported in recent work from Mutz (2018) on the role of status threat in the 
2016 election. 
RQ3b asked whether there was a difference in network partisan distance across ethnic 
and racial identities. Results indicated that black and white respondents had lower levels of 
partisan distance from ego within their networks than did respondents who identified themselves 
as “other.” One explanation for this finding is that Americans are heavily geographically sorted 
by race and ethnicity, as well as often being sorted along racial lines in terms of kin and 
workplaces. It is possible that those in the “other group” were more likely to have cross-cutting 
discussion networks because that group includes respondents who identified as two or more 
races. If discussion networks are based on convenience rather than selection for similar political 
views, these individuals may have developed cross-cutting discussion networks as a result of 
having kin and social contacts whose political views were informed by different racial identities 
(whether directly because of the relationship between these identities and desired policy or 
because these political views are themselves partially produced and reinforced by racial sorting).  
 During the campaign, both parties positioned their constituents as belonging to a 
struggling working class ignored or exploited by wealthy elites from the other party. After 
Trump’s victory, much media coverage focused on the economic anxieties of working-class 
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Trump supporters, and the wealthier liberal Democrats in political bubbles that kept them from 
understanding their plight. Addressing whether network partisanship differed with income level 
(RQ4a), I found that higher- and middle-income respondents had more Republican discussion 
networks than lower-income individuals. This finding (consistent with Knoke, 1990 and Sinclair, 
2012), does not fit this narrative neatly, as the most economically vulnerable individuals found 
themselves in Democrat-leaning networks while there was no significant difference in 
partisanship or between middle- and upper- income voters.  To the extent that income level plays 
a role in partisan sorting, it is theorized that higher income could be associated with more 
exclusive social groups, workplaces, and neighborhoods and that those who can afford to select 
these exclusive memberships would seek out those where they saw others like themselves or who 
shared their views. 
Results in response to whether network partisan distance from ego varied with income 
(RQ4b) further complicate this narrative. Analysis shows that higher- and middle-income 
respondents had more ideologically homogenous political discussion networks. While not 
exclusive to Democrats, this does suggest that the wealthy are more likely to exist in networks 
that could serve as political echo chambers. It is possible that individuals with more resources 
have more ability to select for places to live and work where the population shares their views 
and goals.  
 Additionally, the reproduction of intergenerational wealth results in certain 
sociodemographic groups being more likely to have access to jobs that provide greater income, 
meaning that differences between income brackets may be related to sociodemographic sorting 
that results in partisan differences. This is particularly notable considering Mutz’s (2018) finding 
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that feelings of status anxiety, rather than economic anxiety, influenced whether voters leaned 
Republican or Democratic in the 2016 election. 
 As with income, the media narrative surrounding the role of education in the election 
suggested a highly-educated Democratic constituency so consumed by their own left-leaning 
political bubbles that they did not realize they were alienating the less-educated and driving them 
to the politically incorrect candidate Trump. RQ5a asked whether network partisanship differed 
with education level. Again, however, the descriptive data on 2016 voters raises questions about 
this assessment, as higher levels of education did not predict a more Democratic-leaning 
discussion environment (and, in fact, those with less than a high school education were more 
likely to have had a more Democratic-leaning discussion network).  
Additionally, RQ5b asked if network partisan distance from ego varied with education 
level. Results showed there was no significant difference between those with a college education 
and those with no more than a high school education in terms of partisanship or partisan distance 
from ego.  Previous work was divided on the subject, but this finding is consistent with Knoke’s 
(1990) finding that educational attainment was not a factor contributing to networks political 
homogeneity. While this gives more support to Knoke’s position, it is possible that education 
plays a role when controlling for factors such as income and race that were not explored here, 
and additional work is needed before Sinclair’s (2012) position can be rejected. 
 RQ6a asked whether there was a relationship between network closeness and network 
partisanship. Results found no such relationship, which is not especially surprising as there is no 
precedent to assume that Republicans would feel closer to Republicans than Democrats would 
feel to Democrats or vice versa. RQ6b asked if there was a relationship between closeness and 
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network partisan distance from ego. Closeness was found to be negatively related to network 
partisan distance from ego, suggesting that individuals feel closer to discussion partners when 
they have networks that are generally ideologically similar. Future research will need to examine 
whether this result is limited to individuals feeling closer to like-minded discussion partners, or 
whether people also feel closer to those with different perspectives when the network as a whole 
has views closer to their own. 
 Examining descriptive data about voters by individual demographic characteristics is 
useful for examining claims about how specific demographic divisions shaped the 2016 election. 
However, exploring single elements of identity has its limits, and does not allow for an 
understanding of how intersection dimensions of class and identity create more specific 
positionalities for voters and shape their behavior. While examining the specifics of those cross-
sections is beyond the scope of this project, the regression models incorporating all of these 
factors provide a starting point.  
Selective Exposure 
 In response to RQ7a, on whether network partisanship was related to later selective 
exposure, results found no significant difference in between Republicans and Democrats. This 
indicates that both parties are equally likely to exhibit selective behavior. 
RQ7b asked about the relationship between network partisan distance from ego and later 
selective exposure. Results showed a weak but significant negative relationship between network 
partisan distance from ego and subsequent selective exposure when controlling for the previously 
addressed demographic factors. This is consistent with models that suggest ideological insularity 
contributes to selective exposure (additionally, previous theoretical work and the results 
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regarding RQ7d support this directional reading). Such an impact could result from the 
discussion network strengthening ego’s position such that dissonant information would create 
more cognitive dissonance or such that ego would be more likely to perceive news agreeing with 
their position as high quality, but it is also possible that individuals would simply be exposed to 
more like-minded news or go out of their way to find news that would help them maintain a 
position palatable to the group. 
No relationship was found between selective exposure and subsequent network partisanship 
(RQ7c).  This is unsurprising considering that selective exposure has not been found to be 
specific to just one party, but the question was asked in order to begin establishing directionality 
had a relationship between network partisanship and later selective exposure been found. 
Finally, no relationship was found between selective exposure and later network partisan 
distance from ego. This is consistent with the idea that political discussion plays a role in shaping 
media consumption but that individuals do not choose discussion partners based on compatibility 
with political preferences.  
Limitations and Future Work 
This thesis is limited in what it can infer from these findings. In addition to the limitations 
inherent in the use of panel survey data (See Chapter 3, Limitations), the analysis employed in 
this thesis has limits in terms of broader applicability.  The majority of the analysis of discussion 
network composition is descriptive in nature. While it is illuminating in terms of understanding 
the 2016 presidential campaign, my findings do not necessarily extend to previous or future 
periods of American history, when individuals might be sorted along different characteristics 
than are salient in the current political climate or when individuals might be less inclined to align 
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with a specific political party. However, to the extent that polarization is increasing rather than 
decreasing and to the extent that individuals do in fact select discussion partners based on 
convenience, network ideological homogeneity may be resilient to change. 
More work is needed to understand the ways in which the sociodemographic identities 
examined in this thesis intersect. While a true examination of interaction effects was beyond the 
scope of this project, preliminary regression suggests that some of the differences across income, 
race, education, and partisanship may derive from sorting along other factors. A more complex 
dedicated study could examine these interactions more thoroughly, providing greater insight into 
the complexities of partisan sorting. 
Future work will also need to establish experimental conditions to assess whether greater 
network ideological homogeneity actually contributes to increased selective exposure, though 
finding ways to control for other factors while replicating the way in which both political 
discussions and media consumption play out over time will require creative design. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study’s contributions to the literature are twofold. First, it provides new insight into 
the discussion network composition of Americans during the 2016 campaign, looking at the 
networks of key sociodemographic groups through the lens of not only partisanship but also 
ideological distance. In doing so, it highlights how partisanship, race, income, and education 
correspond with differences in discussion networks that have the potential to influence both 
political opinions and drive selective exposure. While there has long been a reasonable level of 
consensus that demographic factors play a role in the sorting that leads to ideologically similar 
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discussion networks, this project is among the first since the rise of social networking sites to 
assess these differences across those factors. In doing so, it provides a better understanding of 
how subgroups differ in the degree of partisanship and degree of ideological difference and 
suggest avenues for further inquiry. 
 Understanding both the partisan lean and degree of partisanship associated with these 
subgroups creates space for considering how social structures can contribute to the reinforcement 
of specific political ideas. For example, the finding that black and white Americans experience 
similar levels of network partisan distance (but different levels of network partisanship) while 
those identifying as multiple races or other experience less ideological homogeneity suggests a 
need to better understand how those who are not sorted neatly into the nations’ largest racial 
divide are (or are not) still sorted and how they negotiate a space within more diverse networks. 
 However, the broadest implications of this research come from analysis of the 
relationship between network composition and partisan selective exposure. While it might seem 
intuitive that there is no relationship between network partisanship and selective exposure from 
year to year (or vice versa), it is noteworthy that there is a relationship between network partisan 
distance and later partisan selective exposure (but not between partisan selective exposure and 
later network partisan distance). Causality cannot be established from this relationship, but the 
finding is consistent with literature theorizing that individuals do not select discussion partners 
primarily on compatibility of political partisanship or ideology, but do select for media that 
matches their beliefs. Building on Shah et al.’s model (2017), we can conceive of possible 
mechanisms through which having low network partisan distance could increase selective 
exposure. On the one hand, homogeneous political discussion networks may lead individuals to 
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feel more comfortable expressing partisan beliefs and to hear more similar beliefs. Both can 
increase the strength of their convictions and lead to increased cognitive dissonance when 
encountering a contradictory perspective or increasingly biased perceptions of what news is 
accurate. Additionally, having more homogenous networks might create more incentive for 
individuals to find sources of information that allow them to arrive at a particular belief. Thus, 
this finding can fit within the existing framework of cognitive dissonance, perceived accuracy, 
and lay epistemic explanations for selective exposure. 
 As online communication and media consumption more and more becomes the norm, 
understanding how fragmentation into like-minded communities and exposure to niche news 
relate to one another and to political polarization will become increasingly important. This thesis 
has begun work to envision a more holistic vision of partisan exposure that includes not only the 
news one selects for but also the environment in which one discusses their views and the views 
of their peers. By demonstrating a relationship between the ideological homogeneity of 
discussion networks and partisan selective exposure, this thesis opens the door for more detailed 
research into the interconnected processes through which partisan beliefs are reinforced and 
partisanship grows.  
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Appendix: Survey Questions 
  
A. From which sources did you get news IN THE PAST 14 DAYS that is from [INSERT DAY 
OF THE WEEK] two weeks ago through today. If you are unsure, please DO NOT select it.  
 
[Items in Random Order:] 
1. Rush Limbaugh Show (radio)  
2. ABC’s World News Tonight with David Muir, CBS Evening News with Scott Pelley, or NBC 
Nightly News with Lester Holt  
3. Local television news  
4. Local newspaper  
5. Wall Street Journal  
6. Washington Post  
7. The New York Times  
8. The Huffington Post  
9. Drudge Report  
10. National Public Radio (NPR)  
11. Fox News Cable Channel  
12. CNN  
13. MSNBC  
14. NewsHour on PBS  
15. Breitbart  
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B. For each source listed below, please indicate whether you think it has a [RANDOMLY 
INSERT “liberal or a conservative” or “conservative or a liberal”], or neither type of bias. If 
you are not familiar with the source, please answer “don’t know / not sure.”  
 
[Items in Random Order:] 
1. Rush Limbaugh Show (radio)  
2. Wall Street Journal  
3. Washington Post  
4. The New York Times  
5. Huffington Post  
6. Drudge Report  
7. National Public Radio (NPR)  
8. Fox News Cable Channel  
9. CNN  
10. MSNBC  
11. NewsHour on PBS  
12. Breitbart  
 
[Choices if question read: “liberal or a conservative”:] 
1. Strong liberal bias  
2. Slight liberal bias  
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3. Neither a liberal nor a conservative bias  
4. Slight conservative bias  
5. Strong conservative bias  
6. Don’t know / not sure  
 
[Choices if question read: “liberal or a conservative”:] 
1. Strong conservative bias  
2. Slight conservative bias  
3. Neither a liberal nor a conservative bias  
4. Slight liberal bias  
5. Strong liberal bias  
6. Don’t know / not sure  
 
C1. From time to time, people discuss government, elections, and politics with other people. 
We’d like to know the first names or just the initials of people you talk with about these matters. 
These people might be from your family, from work, from the neighborhood, from some other 
organization you belong to, or they might be from somewhere else. Who is the person you’ve 
talked with most about politics?  
___________________ please enter the person’s name or initials [This is Alter 1 in subsequent 
questions]. 
Base: IF Q34 NOT REFUSED  
C2, 3. Aside from this person, who else have you talked with about politics?  
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___________________ please enter the person’s name or initials [Alter 2 in subsequent 
questions] 
___________________ please enter the person’s name or initials [Alter 3 in subsequent 
questions] 
D. [For each alter:] Is _____________? 
1. Male  
2. Female  
 
E. [For each alter:] How close would you say you are with ________________?  
1. Very close  
2. Close  
3. Fairly close  
4. Not too close  
5. Not at all close  
 
F. [For each alter:] Do you think that _____________ normally favors:  
1. Democrats  
2. Republicans  
3. Different parties depending on the issue or election  
4. Neither Democrats nor Republicans  
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G. [For each alter:] When you discuss politics with _______________, how often do you 
disagree?  
1. All of the time  
2. Most of the time  
3. Half of the time  
4. Hardly ever  
5. Never  
 
 
  
62 
 
 
Bibliography 
Ben-Nun Bloom, P., & Levitan, L. C. (2011). We’re Closer than I Thought: Social Network 
Heterogeneity, Morality, and Political Persuasion. Political Psychology, 32(4), 643–665. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00826.x 
Brashears, M. E. (2011). Small networks and high isolation? A reexamination of American 
discussion networks. Social Networks, 33(4), 331–341. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2011.10.003 
Bump, P. (2017). The states with the biggest political bubbles in 2016 voted for Trump. 
Retrieved August 11, 2018, from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/08/23/the-states-with-the-biggest-
political-bubbles-in-2016-voted-for-trump/?utm_term=.c1b02f9eb5fa 
Chen, W. (2013). Internet Use, Online Communication, and Ties in Americans’ Networks. 
Social Science Computer Review, 31(4), 404–423. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313480345 
Cohn, N. (2016, November 7). This Time, There Really Is a Hispanic Voter Surge. New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/upshot/this-time-there-really-
is-a-hispanic-voter-surge.html 
Delli Carpini, M. X. (2013). Breaking boundaries: Can we bridge the quantitative versus 
qualitative divide through the study of entertainment and politics? International Journal of 
Communication, 7(1), 531–551. 
Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and Education. Education, 50(3), 96. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
63 
 
 
Dilliplane, S., Goldman, S. K., & Mutz, D. C. (2013). Televised Exposure to Politics: New 
Measures for a Fragmented Media Environment. American Journal of Political Science, 
57(1), 236–248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00600.x 
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 65(2), 135–150. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Edwards, K., & Smith, E. E. (1996). A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 5–24. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.71.1.5 
Eveland, W. P., & Kleinman, S. B. (2013). Comparing General and Political Discussion 
Networks Within Voluntary Organizations Using Social Network Analysis. Political 
Behavior, 35(1), 65–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-011-9187-4 
Feld, S. L. (1982). Social Structural Determinants of Similarity among Associates. American 
Sociological Review, 47(6), 797. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095216 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Oxford, England: Row, Peterson, 291. 
Fischer, P., Schulz-Hardt, S., & Frey, D. (2008). Selective Exposure and Information Quantity: 
How Different Information Quantities Moderate Decision Makers’ Preference for 
Consistent and Inconsistent Information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
94(2), 231–244. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.94.2.231 
Foran, C. (2016, November). Women Aren’t Repsonsible for Hillary Clinton’s Defeat. The 
Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/hillary-
clinton-white-women-vote/507422/ 
Fox, E. J. (2016, December). Why Hillary Clinton Couldn’t Win Over Female Voters. Vanity 
64 
 
 
Fair. Retrieved from https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/hillary-clinton-female-
voters 
Goeree, J. K., Mcconnell, M. A., Mitchell, T., Tromp, T., American, S., Journal, E., … Yariv, L. 
(2017). The 1 / d Law of Giving Published by : American Economic Association The 1 / of 
Law of Givingf The recent empirical literature has identified the importance of social 
networks, 2(1). 
Goldman, S. K., Mutz, D. C., & Dilliplane, S. (2013). All Virtue Is Relative: A Response to 
Prior. Political Communication, 30(4), 635–653. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2013.819540 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties The Strength of Weak Ties1. The 
American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469 
Gross, M., Katz, J. E., & Rice, R. E. (2003). Social Consequences of Internet Use: Access, 
Involvement, and Interaction. Contemporary Sociology, 32(6), 691. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1556636 
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. Book, 1(1), v. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/228287 
Hart, W., Albarracín, D., Eagly, A. H., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M. J., & Merrill, L. (2009). Feeling 
validated versus being correct: A meta-analysis of selective exposure to information. 
Psychological Bulletin, 135(4), 555–588. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015701 
Hess, A. (2017). How to Escape Your Political Bubble for a Clearer View. Retrieved August 11, 
2018, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/arts/the-battle-over-your-political-
bubble.html 
65 
 
 
Huckfeldt, R., Mendez, J. M., & Osborn, T. (2004). Disagreement, Ambivalence, and 
Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks. Political 
Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00357.x 
Isenberg, D. J. (1986). Group Polarization. A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 50(6), 1141–1151. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.50.6.1141 
Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in 
media use. Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2008.01402.x 
Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1955). Personal Influence. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Kim, Y. (2015). Does Disagreement Mitigate Polarization? How Selective Exposure and 
Disagreement Affect Political Polarization. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 
92(4), 915–937. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699015596328 
Klofstad, C. A., McClurg, S. D., & Rolfe, M. (2009). Measurement of political discussion 
networks. In Public Opinion Quarterly (Vol. 73, pp. 462–483). 
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfp032 
Knobloch-Westerwick, S., & Meng, J. (2009). Looking the other way. Communication Research, 
36(3), 426–448. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650209333030 
Knoke, D. (1990). Networks of Poliical Action: Toward Theory Construction. Social Forces, 
68(4), 1041–1063. 
Kruglanski, A., & Ajzen, I. (1983). Bias and Error in Human Judgment. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 13, 1–44. Retrieved from 
66 
 
 
http://te7fv6dm8k.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-
8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt
%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Bias+and+Error+in+Human+Ju
d 
Kruglanski, A. W. (1990). Lay Epistemic Theory in Social-Cognitive Psychology. Psychological 
Inquiry, 1(3), 181–197. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0103 
Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1948). The people’s choice: How the voter makes 
up his mind in a presidential campaign. In The people’s choice: How the voter makes up his 
mind in a presidential campaign (pp. 1-9; 73-104). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/000271624926100137 
Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B. R., Miyamoto, S. F., & McFee, W. N. (1954). Voting: A Study of 
Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. American Sociological Review (Vol. 20). 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2092750 
Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Merton, R. K. (1954). Friendship as a social process. Freedom and Control 
in Modern Society, 18(1998), 18–66. Retrieved from 
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&docId=23415760 
Lazer, D., Rubineau, B., Chetkovich, C., Katz, N., & Neblo, M. (2010). The Coevolution of 
Networks and Political Attitudes. Political Communication, 27(3), 248–274. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2010.500187 
Levitan, L. C., & Visser, P. S. (2008). The impact of the social context on resistance to 
persuasion: Effortful versus effortless responses to counter-attitudinal information. Journal 
67 
 
 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(3), 640–649. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.03.004 
Levitan, L. C., & Visser, P. S. (2009). Social network composition and attitude strength: 
Exploring the dynamics within newly formed social networks. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 45(5), 1057–1067. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.001 
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The 
effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 37(11), 2098–2109. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098 
Lupton, R. N., Singh, S. P., & Thornton, J. R. (2015). The Moderating Impact of Social 
Networks on the Relationships Among Core Values, Partisanship, and Candidate 
Evaluations. Political Psychology, 36(4), 399–414. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12102 
Lupton, R., & Thornton, J. (2017). Disagreement, Diversity, and Participation: Examining the 
Properties of Several Measures of Political Discussion Network Characteristics. Political 
Behavior, 39(3), 585–608. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9371-7 
Lyons, J. (2011). Where You Live and Who You Know: Political Environments, Social 
Pressures, and Partisan Stability. American Politics Research, 39, 963–992. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X11408233 
Marsden, P. V. (1987). Core Discussion Networks of Americans. American Sociological Review, 
52(1), 122–131. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095397 
McGill, A. (2016, November). America’s Educational Divide Put Trump in the White House. 
The Atlantic. 
Mcpherson, M., Smith-lovin, L., & Brashears, M. E. (2005). Social I solation i n America : C 
68 
 
 
hanges i n Core Discussion N etworks o ver Two D ecades, 1, 353–375. 
Mcpherson, M., Smith-lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social 
Networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 415–444. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415 
Mondak, J. J. (1995). Media Exposure and Political Discussion in U.S. Elections. The Journal of 
Politics, 57(01), 62–85. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960271 
Murray, C. (2017). Column: Do you live in a bubble? These 100 communities do. Retrieved 
August 11, 2018, from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/column-live-bubble-100-
communities 
Mutz, D. C. (2002a). Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic theory in practice. 
American Political Science Review, 96(1), 111–126. 
https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0003055402004264 
Mutz, D. C. (2002b). The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation. 
American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 838–855. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088437 
Mutz, D. C. (2006). Hearing the other side: Deliberative versus participatory democracy. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mutz, D. C. (2018). Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115(19), 
201718155. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115 
Mutz, D. C., & Martin, P. S. (2001). Facilitating Communication across Lines of Political 
Difference: The Role of Mass Media. The American Political Science Review, 95(1), 97–
114. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
69 
 
 
Newton-Small, J. (2016, November). Why So Many Women Abandoned Hillary Clinton. Time. 
Retrieved from http://time.com/4566748/hillary-clinton-firewall-women/ 
Nir, L. (2005). Ambivalent social networks and their consequences for participation. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 17(4), 422–442. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh069 
Pietryka, M. T. (2016). Accuracy Motivations, Predispositions, and Social Information in 
Political Discussion Networks. Political Psychology, 37(3), 367–386. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12255 
Political Bubbles and Hidden Diversity: Highlights From a Very Detailed Map of the 2016 
Election. (2018). Retrieved August 11, 2018, from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/25/upshot/precinct-map-highlights.html 
Prior, M. (2009). The immensely inflated news audience: Assessing bias in self-reported news 
exposure. Public Opinion Quarterly, 73(1), 130–143. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfp002 
Prior, M. (2013). The Challenge of Measuring Media Exposure: Reply to Dilliplane, Goldman, 
and Mutz. Political Communication, 30(4), 620–634. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2013.819539 
Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling Alone. Bowling Alone. https://doi.org/10.1145/358916.361990 
Right-wing platforms provide refuge to digital outcasts — and Alex Jones. (2018). Retrieved 
August 11, 2018, from https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/right-wing-platforms-
provide-refuge-digital-outcasts-alex-jones-n899161 
Robinson, J. P., & Martin, S. (2010). IT Use and Declining Social Capital? Social Science 
Computer Review, 28(1), 45–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439309335230 
70 
 
 
Robson, D. (2018). The myth of the online echo chamber. Retrieved August 11, 2018, from 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20180416-the-myth-of-the-online-echo-chamber 
Sears, D. O. (1968). The Paradox of De Facto Selective Exposure without Preferences for 
Supportive Information. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. 
J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A 
Sourcebook. Chicago. 
Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Eveland, W. P., & Kwak, N. (2005). Information and expression in a 
digital age: Modeling internet effects on civic participation. Communication Research (Vol. 
32). https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650205279209 
Shah, D. V., McLeod, D. M., Rojas, H., Cho, J., Wagner, M. W., & Friedland, L. A. (2017). 
Revising the Communication Mediation Model for a New Political Communication 
Ecology. Human Communication Research, 43(4), 491–504. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/hcre.12115 
Silver, N. (2016). Education, Not Income, Predicted Who Would Vote For Trump. 
Silver, N. (2017). There Really Was A Liberal Media Bubble. Retrieved August 11, 2018, from 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/there-really-was-a-liberal-media-bubble/ 
Sinclair, B. (2012). The Social Citizen: Peer Networks in Political Behavior. Hearing the other 
side. Retrieved from 
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/?shva=1%5Cnpapers2://publication/uuid/16FBD7B7-
3874-49AA-AC84-
FF66BB6CEEEB%5Cnhttps://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=npAN-
tkbVEoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=social+citizen&ots=eYQ6YTBSJa&sig=loyiDUOe2MlR
71 
 
 
M-HnyMU1yvymAPo 
Slater, M. D. (2007). Reinforcing spirals: The mutual influence of media selectivity and media 
effects and their impact on individual behavior and social identity. Communication Theory, 
17(3), 281–303. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2007.00296.x 
Slater, M. D. (2015). Reinforcing spirals model: conceptualizing the relationship between media 
content exposure and the development and maintenance of attitudes. Media Psychology, 
18(3), 370–395. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2014.897236.Reinforcing 
Snyder, M. (1977). On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 35(9), 656–666. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.656 
Stroud, N. J. (2008). Media use and political predispositions: Revisiting the concept of selective 
exposure. Political Behavior, 30(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9050-9 
Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of Communication, 
60(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x 
Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche News: The Politics of News Choice. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Stroud, N. J., & Collier, J. (2018). Selective Exposure and Homophily During the 2016 
Presidential Campaign. An Unprecedented Election: Campaign Coverage, Communication, 
and Citizens Divided., 16–28. 
Swann, W. B., Milton, L. P., & Polzer, J. T. (2000). Should we create a niche or fall in line? 
Identity negotiation and small group effectiveness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79(2), 238–250. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.2.238 
Thompson, A. (n.d.). Journalists and Trump voters live in separate online bubbles, MIT analysis 
72 
 
 
shows. Retrieved August 11, 2018, from 
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/d3xamx/journalists-and-trump-voters-live-in-separate-
online-bubbles-mit-analysis-shows 
Williams, J. P. (2016, November). Clinton Made Her Case to Black Voters. Why Didn’t They 
Hear Her. US News & World Report. Retrieved from 
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-11-09/clinton-made-her-case-to-black-
voters-why-didnt-they-hear-her 
Wyatt, R. O., Katz, E., & Kim, J. (2000). Bridging the spheres: Political and personal 
conversation in public and private spaces. Journal of Communication, 50(1), 71–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02834.x 
Zhao, S. (2006). Do internet users have more social ties? A call for differentiated analyses of 
internet use. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 11(3), 844–862. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006.00038.x 
Zuckerman, A. S., Dasović, J., & Fitzgerald, J. (2007). Partisan Families: The Social Logic of 
Bounded Partisanship in Germany and Britain, (2002), 193. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167390 
 
 
